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Autonomous weapons systems, colloquially referred to as “killer 
robots,” are becoming less of a science fiction fantasy and more of a reality 
on the modern battlefield. They operate based on Artificial Intelligence 
(AI) which helps them undergo a self-learning thought process, where the 
machines learn new tasks based on responses from previous interactions. 
As the AI behind these systems becomes more sophisticated, the machines 
engage in greater autonomous decision-making.  
As they function with increased autonomy, some weapons experts 
and governments have suggested extending legal personhood to 
autonomous weapons systems because their decision-making resembles 
that of human brains. Theoretically, this extension would resemble how 
corporations operate as legal persons, even though corporations are a type 
of business entity. Although the comparison reveals notable similarities at 
the surface, it ultimately fails. Because autonomous systems are weapons, 
their use must conform to International Humanitarian Law (IHL), which 
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does not support such an extension of corporate personhood. The doctrine 
of IHL has restrictively extended the idea of personhood, and no express 
declaration from either the United States Congress or the United Nations 
supports a broad expansion.  
Furthermore, fundamental principles of corporate law, such as the 
piercing the corporate veil doctrine, cannot apply to autonomous weapons 
systems. Because weapons systems are machines, they cannot hold 
financial assets or deliberately abuse a limited liability shield. Ultimately, 
the failed application of this analogy under IHL combined with the 
inapplicability of key principles of corporate law indicates that extending 
legal personhood to autonomous weapons systems cannot succeed.  
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Robots and autonomous weapons systems are not legal persons under 
the current law.1 Such a distinction is necessary because, although they are 
just machines, the computer programming behind autonomous systems2 is 
rapidly advancing.3 Artificial intelligence (AI)4 is becoming smarter and 
 
1. See Shawn Bayern, The Implications of Modern Business-Entity Law for the 
Regulation of Autonomous Systems, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 93, 93 (2015). 
2. As defined by the U.S. Department of Defense, autonomous weapons systems are 
“weapon system[s] that once activated, can selected and engage targets without further 
intervention by a human operator.” U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, NO. 3000.09, DIRECTIVE: 
AUTONOMY IN WEAPON SYSTEMS 13 (2012) http://bit.ly/2Ne9bg4 [hereinafter DOD 
DIRECTIVE 3000.09]. The phrase “autonomous system” and “autonomous weapons 
system,” may have slightly different connotations, but this Comment uses both terms 
interchangeably to refer to military systems with some degree of automated capacity. See 
generally Raja Chatila & Catherine Tessier, A Guide to Lethal Autonomous Weapon 
Systems, CNRS NEWS FR. (Apr. 9, 2018), https://bit.ly/2QbsSpi.   
3. See Janosch Delcker, Europe divided over robot ‘personhood,’ POLITICO (Apr. 11, 
2018, 12:45 PM), https://politi.co/2GSxkTH. 
4. AI is a sub-field of computer science that examines how machines can imitate 
human mental skills, such as pattern recognition, understanding natural language, or 
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more autonomous and the technology engages in a thought process that 
operates similarly to human consciousness.5 The possibility of recognizing 
personhood for AI is relevant in both civil and military contexts; the latter 
is the focus of this Comment.6  
A notable example of advanced AI in the civilian world is Sophia the 
Robot.7 As her name suggests, Sophia is a robot with a realistic human 
appearance who can engage in conversations and act upon human traits, 
such as compassion.8 In 2017, she was granted full citizenship in Saudi 
Arabia.9 Sophia is the first robot to receive legal citizenship status,10 and 
in 2018 she received the first-ever robot visa.11 While universal rights of 
robots may sound like science fiction, Sophia’s technological 
advancement and international recognition offer a glimpse into the future 
evolution of AI and legal personhood.12  
With respect to the military, autonomous systems are starting to make 
lethal decisions, meaning that the machines, not their human operators, 
decide when to engage in lethal force.13 For example, Russia is currently 
developing a weapon to make “shoot-no-shoot” decisions.14 The U.S. 
Department of Defense (DoD) utilizes autonomous drones.15 And Israel 
currently employs a fully autonomous loitering munition,16 the Harop, 
which can independently dive-bomb radar signals.17  
 
adaptive learning from experience. Bernard Marr, The Key Definitions of Artificial 
Intelligence (AI) That Explain Its Importance, FORBES (Feb. 14, 2018 1:27 AM), 
https://bit.ly/2AynpSI; see also infra Section II.A.  
5. See Delcker, supra note 3. 
6. See infra Section II.B., Part III. 
7. See Sophia, HANSON ROBOTICS, https://bit.ly/2EINLmm (last visited Oct. 30, 
2018). 
8. See id.  
9. See Emily Reynolds, The agony of Sophia, the world’s first robot citizen 
condemned to a lifeless career in marketing, WIRED (June 1, 2018), https://bit.ly/2RyulIW. 
10. See id. 
11. Paul Armstrong, AI Humanoid ‘Sophia’ Is Granted First Ever Robot Visa, Speaks 
With President, FORBES (Oct. 27, 2018, 10:42 AM), https://bit.ly/2AADM13. 
12. Despite her developments, Sophia is not without criticism. See Jaden Urbi, The 
complicated truth about Sophia the robot-an almost human robot or a PR stunt, CNBC 
(June 5, 2018, 11:15 AM), https://cnb.cx/2kQLzPD. Sophia is criticized because she 
appears “hot” or “sexy.” See id. Others question why she was granted citizenship in Saudi 
Arabia, which is a nation that still maintains male guardianship over women. See Reynolds, 
supra note 9. 
13. See Billy Perrigo, A Global Arms Race for Killer Robots Is Transforming the 
Battlefield, TIME (Apr. 9, 2018, 2:12 PM), https://bit.ly/2C9FHK0.  
14. See id. 
15. While not all autonomous drones are weaponized, they nevertheless exemplify 
how this technology is evolving and has the potential for a military capacity. See id. They 
also demonstrate the military’s interest in autonomous technology. Id. 
16. A loitering munition is a weapons system that “loiters” above the target and 
strikes its target after waiting for it to arrive. Aire Egozi, Loitering Weapon Systems - A 
Growing Demand, IHLS (Dec. 16, 2016), https://bit.ly/2PL4UCt. 
17. See Perrigo, supra note 13 (recognizing nations that have already deployed AI in 
a military capacity); see also infra Section III.B. 
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While militarized AI is largely a vision of the future, legal 
personhood for robots is a topic of current discussion in the international 
community.18 In 2017, the European Parliament suggested that self-
learning robots19 should receive electronic personalities,20 which would be 
a limited legal status specific to robots.21 However, 156 AI experts, 
consisting of computer scientists, law professors, and CEOs,22 responded 
with a letter23 arguing against the proposition.24 The experts insisted that 
the current civil laws of the European Union are sufficient to manage robot 
liability.25 In addition to the ethical implications of elevating robots to a 
personhood status, the experts asserted that granting this special legal 
status could insulate manufacturers from liability.26 Ultimately, the 
European Commission did not implement the European Parliament’s 
suggestion of electronic personhood.27 Although the European 
Commission did not validate electronic personhood in this instance, the 
discussion is not foreclosed. As AI technology continues to evolve, other 
governments and legislatures will consider the question as to the 
appropriate legal status for this person-like technology.28  
With respect to militarized AI, autonomous weapons systems differ 
from traditional weapons because these systems act in accordance with 
software codes and programming, as opposed to direct human control.29 
Thus, anticipating and accounting for the behavior of militarized AI is 
difficult.30 The absence of direct human control is prompting governments 
 
18. See Thomas Burri, The EU is right to refuse legal personality for Artificial 
Intelligence, EUROACTIV (May 31, 2018), https://bit.ly/2EZE30h; see also infra Section 
III.B. 
19. Self-learning robots learn new tasks through a trial and error process, which is 
similar to how humans learn. See John Straw, Self Learning Robots, DISRUPTIONHUB (June 
18, 2015), https://bit.ly/33sxrRa. 
20. Electronic personhood and electronic personality both refer to the idea of granting 
a legal entity status to robots. See Delcker, supra note 3. 
21. This legal status would allow robots to be sued and insured individually and 
obtain liability and protections separate from their creators. See id. Robots would not be 
full citizens with all rights of people. For example, they would not have the right to marry. 
See id. 
22. Nathalie Navejan, a French law professor at the Université d’Artois, and Noel 
Sharkey, a professor of artificial intelligence and robotics at the University of Sheffield, 
were two of the experts who expressed concern that electronic personhood would absolve 
manufactures of liability. See id. 
23. The letter received the consensus that granting robots electronic personhood 
would be irresponsible for ethical and legal reasons. See id. 
24. See id. 
25. See id. 
26. See Delcker, supra note 3. 
27. See Burri, supra note 18. 
28. See Delcker, supra note 3. 
29. See Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 513, 
534 (2015). 
30. See id. 
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to consider issues of accountability when determining the proper status of 
these systems. 
The advanced capabilities of autonomous weapons systems have led 
experts to question the proper entity status of these systems.31 Similar to 
how autonomous weapons systems act without the necessary involvement 
of individual people, corporations can act in their own name.32 Therefore, 
assigning a legal personhood status to autonomous weapons systems 
would seem to mirror the reasoning behind corporate personhood.33 
However, the fact that these systems are ultimately just weapons, 
combined with the different bodies of law that govern weapons as opposed 
to corporations, reasons against expanding corporate personhood to these 
systems.34 
Part II of this Comment will present an overview of the background 
material relevant to the analysis of this Comment.35 Specifically, Part II 
will provide a general overview of AI36 and how AI can act with varying 
degrees of autonomy;37 the military potential for AI;38 how the corporate 
personhood theory has evolved over time into granting a legal entity status 
with very high levels of autonomy;39 and the laws of war that govern the 
use of autonomous weapons systems.40  
Next, Part III will explain how the theories of corporate personhood 
do not analogize to autonomous weapons systems when analyzed under 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL).41 Part III will then argue that IHL 
is the best doctrine under which to analyze the entity status of autonomous 
weapons systems and explain how customary international law 
distinguishes machines from humans.42 Next, Part III will analyze why the 
piercing the corporate veil doctrine does not apply to autonomous 
systems.43 Ultimately, Part III will recommend that legal personhood 
should not extend to autonomous systems.44 Finally, Part IV will offer 
concluding statements on the issues raised by this Comment.45  
 
31. See Delcker, supra note 3. 
32. See Bayern, supra note 1, at 96. 
33. See id. at 94. 
34. See infra Part III. 
35. See infra Part II. 
36. See infra Section II.A. 
37. See infra Section II.A. 
38. See infra Section II.B. 
39. See infra Section II.C. 
40. See infra Section II.D. 
41. See infra Section III.A. 
42. See infra Section III.B. 
43. See infra Section III.C. 
44. See infra Section III.D. 
45. See infra Part IV. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
As AI becomes more autonomous and “human-like,” some experts 
have looked to the evolving theories of corporate personhood as a structure 
for categorizing autonomous systems.46 Similarly, as corporations have 
evolved, the corresponding corporate personhood theories have mirrored 
this development to allow a corporation to be viewed as an independent 
and distinct entity.47 Unlike corporations, which are legal entities governed 
by state law, autonomous systems are weapons systems that are governed 
by IHL, which does not support an expansion of legal personhood to non-
human entities.48  
A. What is AI, and How Does It Work? 
AI is a sub-field of computer science that examines how machines 
can imitate human mental skills, such as pattern recognition, 
understanding natural language, and adaptive learning from experience.49 
Broadly, AI is composed of computations that allow machines to 
“perceive, reason, and act.”50 Specifically, AI is “[t]he theory and 
development of computer systems able to perform tasks normally 
requiring human intelligence, such as visual perception, speech 
recognition, decision-making, and translation between languages.”51 AI 
distinguishes itself from regular computer programming because the 
machines are able to learn and subsequently correct themselves.52 Thus, 
AI uses a trial and error “thought process” which mimics the mental 
process that the human brain performs when learning a new task.53 
In terms of measuring AI development, AI can fall into one of three 
categories: narrow;54 strong;55 or superintelligence.56 Narrow AI is 
“machine intelligence that equals or exceeds human intelligence for 
specific tasks.”57 For example, narrow AI includes algorithms that route 
 
46. See Bayern, supra note 1, at 93 (discussing the application of modern entity law 
for autonomous systems). 
47. See infra Section II.C. 
48. See infra Sections III.A–B. 
49. See Marr, supra note 4.  
50. STEPHAN DE SPIEGELEIRE ET AL., ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE FUTURE OF 
DEFENSE: STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS FOR SMALL AND MEDIUM SIZED FORCE PROVIDERS 27 
(2017), http://bit.ly/2CuV1lQ. 
51. Marr, supra note 4. 
52. See Sarah Dai & Alice Shen, Made in China 2025: China has a competitive AI 
game plan but success will need cooperation, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Oct. 1, 2018, 
11:00 PM), https://bit.ly/2Rj1a9w. 
53. See id. 
54. See Ray Kurzweil, On My Mind: Long Live AI, FORBES (Aug. 15, 2005), 
https://bit.ly/2CNkmHG. 
55. See id. 
56. See id. 
57. See id. 
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information used when a person sends an email.58 Strong AI, on the other 
hand, is “machine intelligence with the full range of human intelligence.”59 
Sophia the Robot, for instance, is likely considered strong AI because she 
functions with machine learning akin to human consciousness.60 Finally, 
super-intelligent AI is “machine intelligence that exceeds human 
intelligence across any task.”61 Even though computers can beat humans 
at Jeopardy, and devices such as Siri62 engage in simple conversations, the 
general consensus remains that no super-intelligent AI exists, even though 
those examples function at a super-intelligent level.63 
B. Autonomous Systems Within the U.S. Military 
AI also includes weapons systems that act with varying degrees of 
autonomy.64 Autonomy refers to the ability of a machine to perform a task 
or function on its own.65 An autonomous weapons system is “any system 
that is capable of targeting and initiating the use of potentially lethal force 
without direct human supervision . . . in lethal decision-making.”66 Some 
systems operate completely independently, whereas others require human 
involvement to help the machine make decisions.67  
Several definitions exist regarding what constitutes autonomy in the 
weapons context.68 For example, the DoD defines an autonomous weapon 
as a system that “once active, can select and engage targets without further 
intervention by a human operator.”69 Semi-autonomous weapons, on the 
other hand, are weapons systems that are only aimed to engage individual 
and specific targets that are pre-selected by a human operator.70  
 
58. See id. 
59. Id. 
60. See Reynolds, supra note 9. 
61. DE SPIEGELEIRE ET AL., supra note 50, at 30. A superintelligent system would be 
able to conduct decision-making that goes beyond our current cognitive abilities. See Luke 
Dormehl, A beginner’s guide to A.I. superintelligence and ‘the singularity, DIGITAL 
TRENDS (Oct. 4, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://bit.ly/2wxekVH.  
62. Siri is an “intelligent assistant” on iPhones that utilizes machine learning to 
respond to voice commands from the user. Siri, APPLE, https://apple.co/32lDaqY (last 
visited Feb. 9, 2020). 
63. See Artificial Superintelligence (ASI), TECHOPEDIA, https://bit.ly/2EPf9B5 (last 
visited Feb. 9, 2020). 
64. See PAUL SCHARRE, ARMY OF NONE: AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS AND THE FUTURE 
OF WAR 27 (1st ed. 2018). 
65. See id. 
66. Peter Asaro, On banning autonomous weapon systems: human rights, 
automation, and the dehumanization of lethal decision-making, 94 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 
687, 690 (2012). 
67. See SCHARRE, supra note 64, at 30.  
68. See Amitai Etzioni & Oren Etzioni, Pros and Cons of Autonomous Weapon 
Systems, MIL. REV., May–June 2017, at 72, 77.  
69. DOD DIRECTIVE 3000.09, supra note 2, at 13. 
70. See id. 
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The level of a machine’s autonomy depends on the degree to which 
it performs tasks independently and with less direction from human 
operators.71 The DoD unmanned system roadmaps72 classify autonomy 
along a spectrum,73 which separates into three primary categories.74  
The first category focuses on the task the machine is performing.75 
Generally, the machine will perform some tasks autonomously while 
humans remain in control of others.76 For example, U.S. fighter aircraft 
have been modified with an automatic ground collision avoidance system 
(Auto-GCAS).77 If the pilot is about to crash, Auto-GCAS will take control 
of the aircraft and pull it up away from the ground before it crashes.78 
Hence, the machine makes the decision about pulling away from the 
ground and deciding the best manner to avoid a crash.79  
A machine should not be referred to as autonomous without reference 
to the exact task that becomes automated.80 For example, cars are driven 
by humans but operate with autonomous functions, such as automatic 
braking, automatic seat belt retractions, and automatic airbags.81 These 
autonomous functions assist the driver, but the car is not a fully 
autonomous machine because the car remains under direct human 
control.82 A car, therefore, operates similarly to the Auto-GCAS system 
because a human remains in control of the operations except for select 
safety functions. 
The second category along the autonomy spectrum focuses on the 
relationship between the human and the machine when the machine 
performs a task.83 This category further divides into two types of 
operations. The first is “semiautonomous operations,” in which the human 
is “in” the loop.84 The second is “supervised autonomous operations,” in 
which the human sits “on” the loop.85 The term “loop” refers to the military 
 
71. See SCHARRE, supra note 64, at 28. 
72. The DoD Unmanned Systems Roadmaps discuss the development of autonomous 
systems. See GCN Staff, DOD’s roadmap to integrated unmanned systems, GCN (Sept. 
14, 2018), https://bit.ly/2UFUP9h. They discuss how the technology can be integrated into 
the current operations of the DoD. See id; see also DOD DIRECTIVE 3000.09, supra note 2, 
at 1. 
73. See SCHARRE, supra note 64, at 27. 
74. See id. at 28.  
75. See id. 
76. See id. 
77. See id. 
78. See id. (noting that this system has already saved at least one aircraft in combat, 
rescuing a U.S. F-16 in Syria). 
79. See id. 
80. See id. 
81. See id. 
82. See SCHARRE, supra note 64, at 28. 
83. See id. 
84. See id. at 29. 
85. See id. 
2020 FROM SIRI TO SCI-FI 509 
OODA loop,86 which stands for “observe, orient, decide, and act.”87 This 
loop guides the AI’s rational thinking towards responding to a stimulus in 
chaotic or confusing situations.88  
A semiautonomous system can sense the environment and 
recommend how to proceed, yet the machine cannot perform the task until 
it receives a human command.89 Hence, the human is “in” the loop because 
he remains involved in how the machine senses, decides, and then acts.90 
A supervised autonomous system can sense, decide, and act on its 
own, but a human user retains control over the machine’s behavior, 
allowing the person to potentially intervene and change the machine’s 
behavior.91 For example, humans stay “on” the loop in combat operations 
to protect communication links of cyber operations.92 The human 
involvement ensures that the technology is not compromised by an adverse 
armed party.93 The machine does not make its own determinations.94 
Hence, the human primarily serves as a check on the machine’s decision-
making.95 For example, the human supervisor decides to land an aircraft 
or decides to order mechanical parts.96 Thus, the human user working with 
a supervised autonomous system is “on” the loop.97  
For example, the Phalanx Close-In Weapons Systems (CIWS) is an 
independent and self-contained unit with an automated fire-control 
system.98 Thus, a CIWS can automatically search for, detect, track, 
engage, and confirm targets using its computer-controlled radar system.99 
The CIWS requires human supervision and only attacks specific targets, 
such as missiles or boats, that the human operators identify.100 
The third category refers to the sophistication of the machine’s 
decision-making process when performing a task.101 Fully autonomous 
 
86. See id. 
87. See OODA LOOP: What You Can Learn from Fighter Pilots About Making Fast 
and Accurate Decisions, FARNAM STREET BLOG, https://bit.ly/2CaM3c3 (last visited Oct. 
27, 2018). 
88. See id.  
89. See SCHARRE, supra note 64, at 29. 
90. See id. 
91. See SCHARRE, supra note 64, at 29. 
92. See David Vergun, Supervised autonomy the goal in Army aviation, says major 
general, ARMY.MIL (Sept. 14, 2017), https://bit.ly/2BD2j4M. 
93. See id.  
94. See id. 
95. See id.  
96. See id.  
97. See SCHARRE, supra note 64, at 29. 
98. See Charlie Dunlap, Jr., Autonomous weapons and the law: the Yale and 
Brookings discussions, LAWFIRE BLOG (Apr. 9, 2018), https://bit.ly/2AsLpGs.  
99. See id.  
100. See id.  
101. See SCHARRE, supra note 64, at 30. 
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systems sense, decide, and act without human intervention.102 The human 
is entirely “out” of the loop.103 The machine is acting on its own, as would 
a regular solider. Before deploying a fully autonomous weapon, however, 
a fully autonomous machine must “learn” to act consistently within the 
laws of war.104 Assuming that the autonomous system operates lawfully, 
AI experts and military personnel suggest that autonomous systems have 
great military potential because of a machine’s ability to act more precisely 
than humans.105 Machines do not experience fatigue and emotions that can 
impair judgment, and consequently diminish the quality of a task.106 
Beginning in 2005, the DoD began publishing a series of roadmaps 
for future unmanned system investment.107 These roadmaps discussed 
sensors, communications, power, weapons, propulsion, and other 
technologies.108 The DoD roadmaps have the long-term goal of achieving 
complete autonomy for these weapons systems.109 The 2011 roadmap 
outlines four stages of autonomy: (1) human-operated; (2) human 
delegate; (3) human supervised; and (4) fully autonomous.110 Investment 
in unmanned systems is expanding,111 per the goals of the DoD, with the 
eventual goal of fully integrating unmanned systems into combat 
operations over the next 25 years.112 Advanced autonomous systems 
would have the ability to analyze and adapt to the environment, and they 
would interact with other autonomous systems.113  
As AI advances, autonomy is a key objective as it reduces the human 
workload required for military operations.114 A lighter human workload 
will lead to greater military efficiencies,115 such as manpower 
 
102. See id. 
103. See id. 
104. See Dunlap, supra note 98; see also infra Section II.D. 
105. See Dunlap, supra note 98. 
106. See id. 
107. See SCHARRE, supra note 64, at 27. 
108. See id., at 15.  
109. See id. 
110. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., UNMANNED SYSTEMS INTEGRATED ROADMAP: FY2011-
2036 46 (2011) [hereinafter UNMANNED SYSTEMS INTEGRATED ROADMAP]. 
111. See Michael C. Horowitz, The Algorithms of August, FOREIGN POL’Y (Sept. 12, 
2018, 8:00 AM), https://bit.ly/2x6tNxD (commenting that the private sector invested 
between 15 and 23 billion dollars in AI in 2016). 
112. See UNMANNED SYSTEMS INTEGRATED ROADMAP, supra note 110, at 46 
(commenting that the full potential of unmanned systems will occur when they have highly 
autonomous capabilities and can interact with their surroundings). 
113. See id. 
114. See id. at 20. In January 2017, the DoD produced an autonomous drone swarm 
of 103 robots flying over California whose flight path was determined in real-time by an 
algorithm. See Perrigo, supra note 13. Even though this is not a weaponized example, it 
demonstrates the rapidly evolving trend of this technology and hints at its military 
application. See UNMANNED SYSTEMS INTEGRATED ROADMAP, supra note 110, at 20. 
115. See UNMANNED SYSTEMS INTEGRATED ROADMAP, supra note 110, at 20. 
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productivities, cost savings,116 and quicker human decision-making.117 
Autonomous systems produce greater military advantages like increasing 
the efficacy of each combatant, expanding the battlefield to previously 
inaccessible areas and reducing causalities by removing human 
combatants from dangerous missions.118 
C. Overview of the Development of Corporate Personhood 
As AI becomes more advanced, experts and governments have 
considered granting the technology a special legal status similar to that of 
a corporation.119 A corporation is an artificial entity that exists through 
recognition of the law and can act only through its agents.120 A corporation 
is also a legal entity with an identity, or personality, that is completely 
separate from that of its owners.121 To gain this separate identity, a 
corporation must incorporate122 by filing the articles of incorporation with 
a state’s Secretary of State.123  
Corporations have standing to enter into contracts, hold property, sue 
and be sued, and conduct business in the corporate name.124 Unless its 
articles of incorporation provide otherwise, every corporation generally 
has the same powers as an individual to do all things necessary to fully 
 
116. In a 2013 article in The Fiscal Times, DoD figures estimated that “each soldier 
in Afghanistan costs the Pentagon roughly $850,000 per year,” whereas “the TALON 
robot, a small rover outfitted with weapons, costs $230,000.” Etzioni & Etzioni, supra note 
68, at 72. 
117. UNMANNED SYSTEMS INTEGRATED ROADMAP, supra note 110, at 45–48; see also 
Mark M. Beard, Autonomous Weapons and Human Responsibilities, 45 GEO. J. INT’L L. 
617, 625 (2014) (citing National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Pub. L. 
No. 106-398, § 220(a), 114 Stat. 1654, 1654A to 38 (2000)) (mandating that one-third of 
designated U.S. military aircraft and ground combat vehicles be unmanned by 2010 and 
2015). 
118. See Etzioni & Etzioni, supra note 68, at 72. 
119. See Bayern, supra note 1, at 97; see also Delcker, supra note 3. 
120. See Premium Prod., Inc. v. Pro Performance Sports, LLC, 997 F. Supp. 2d 433, 
437 (E.D. Va. 2014). 
121. See Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. Nat’l Distillers & Chemical Corp., 483 F.2d 
1098, 1102 (5th Cir. 1973). 
122. To incorporate, a person from the company engages in the process of filing the 
necessary documents with the Secretary of State to form a legal corporation. See 
Incorporation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
123. See DOUGLAS M. BRANSON ET AL., BUSINESS ENTERPRISES: LEGAL STRUCTURES, 
GOVERNANCE, AND POLICY 191 (3d ed. 2016). The articles of incorporation refer to the 
original articles of incorporations, all amendments, and any other documents permitted or 
required to be filed with the Secretary of State. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.02 (AM. 
BAR ASS’N 2016). At a minimum, the articles of incorporation must include (1) a corporate 
name for the corporation; (2) the number of shares the corporation is authorized to issue; 
(3) the street address of the corporation’s registered office and the name of its registered 
agent at that office; and (4) the name and address of each incorporator. See id. 
124. See Susanna Kim Ripken, Corporations Are People Too: A Multi-Dimensional 
Approach to the Corporate Personhood Puzzle, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 97, 106 
(2009). 
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conduct its business and affairs,125 such as signing contracts or accruing 
business debts.126 Because a corporation is an artificial concept, and not a 
natural human, these actions are conducted by the directors or officers of 
the corporation.127  
Shareholders in a corporation are not personally liable for the debts 
and obligations of the corporation.128 This limited liability of shareholders 
allows for greater business growth, increased access to monetary 
resources, and reduced risk to shareholders wanting to invest in a business 
without becoming personally liable to the company’s creditors.129 
Despite the general guarantees of limiting personal liability after 
incorporating, this advantage is not absolute.130 The doctrine of piercing 
the corporate veil131 allows courts to impose personal liability on 
shareholders for the debts or liabilities of the corporation when the 
corporation engages in some form of misconduct.132 Hence, incorporating 
does not create a complete barrier from liability.133 The rationale for 
piercing the corporate veil is that if the beneficial “veil” of limited liability 
is abused then liability for wrongdoing should fall on the blameworthy 
actor, which could be an individual within the company.134  
Two general factors exist in piercing the corporate veil cases: (1) 
domination or control by a shareholder, whether an individual or another 
corporate entity, over the subject corporation; and (2) a fraud, wrong, or 
injustice.135 Within these general factors, smaller considerations often 
influence courts to find personal liability: (1) lack of corporate formalities; 
(2) commingling of corporate assets; (3) undercapitalization;136 (4) 
 
125. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.02 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
126. See id. § 6.22 (stating that a shareholder of a corporation is not personally liable 
for the acts or debts of the corporation except that he may become personally liable by 
reason of his own acts or conduct). 
127. See BRANSON ET AL., supra note 123, at 368. 
128. See id. at 297. 
129. See id. But cf. N. Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 
481, 493 (1909) (recognizing corporate criminal liability). 
130. See BRANSON ET AL., supra note 123, at 297; see also infra Section III.C. 
131. See infra Section III.C. 
132. See BRANSON ET AL., supra note 123, at 297-99. But see Krivo Indus. Supply Co. 
v. Nat’l Distillers & Chemical Corp., 483 F.2d 1098, 1102 (5th Cir. 1973) (noting that the 
corporate form should not be taken lightly given that it is one the principle benefits behind 
the purpose of incorporation). 
133. See BRANSON ET AL., supra note 123, at 299. 
134. See id. at 298; see also United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 
F. 247, 255 (E.D. Wis. 1905) (“[W]hen the notion of legal entity is used to defeat public 
convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, the law will regard the 
corporation as an association of persons.”). 
135. See BRANSON ET AL., supra note 123, at 299. 
136. Undercapitalization refers to a company that does not have enough capital to 
conduct its business. See Capitalization, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Thus, 
when a company lacks sufficient capital, it is undercapitalized. Id. The theory behind 
undercapitalization is that if owners chose to run a business with insufficient capital to 
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allegation of a tort; and (5) misrepresentation or fraud.137 The corporate 
veil is pierced based on an individualized fact-based analysis, as opposed 
to a process codified by state statute.138 The factual context is extremely 
important in weighing the relevant factors in deciding whether to pierce 
the corporate veil.139 
Years of U.S. jurisprudence have allowed the term “person” to 
include both natural persons and artificial entities, such as corporations.140 
Thus, legal personhood for corporations has developed through various 
theories over time.141 Corporations have been thought of as (1) an artificial 
and dependent person, (2) an aggregate person, and, most recently, (3) a 
real and independent person.142  
Under the first theory, which arose during the first half of the 
Nineteenth Century,143 a corporation was viewed as an artificial and 
dependent person that is solely a legal construct created to facilitate 
commerce.144 If a corporation only receives legal recognition through state 
approval, the corporation depends on the law to recognize its legal 
personhood,145 and it possesses only the abilities that the state chose to 
grant.146 Under this theory, legal personality was primarily granted when 
a corporation could offer society a specific benefit that required this 
separate legal status.147  
The second theory of corporate personhood, which arose during the 
last half of the Nineteenth Century,148 views the corporation as an 
aggregate person because a corporation could not be formed without the 
 
cover expenses, then they should accrue personal liability. See BRANSON ET AL., supra note 
123, at 302. Although deciding to pierce the corporate veil is done on a case-by-case basis, 
when combined with other factors, undercapitalization is a significant factor for 
consideration. See BRANSON ET AL., supra note 123, at 302. 
137. BRANSON ET AL., supra note 123, at 300–04. 
138. See id. at 298 (citing MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.22 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2005)). 
139. See id. at 305. 
140. See 18 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 65 (2018). But see People ex rel. Nonhuman 
Rights Project, Inc. v. Larvey, 124 A.D.3d 148, 148 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014) (holding that a 
chimpanzee was not a person entitled to rights afforded by a writ of habeas corpus). 
141. See Ripken, supra note 124, at 106. 
142. See id. (citing MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.02 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2005)). 
143. See id. at 107. 
144. See id. at 106.  
145. See id. at 107. 
146. See Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819). 
147. See Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 549 (1933) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting); see also Prairie Capital III, L.P. v. Double E. Holding Corp., 132 A.3d 35, 59 
(Del. Ch. 2015) (first citing Trs. of Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. at 636 (“[a] corporation is an 
artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law, and being 
a purely metaphysical creature . . . because it lacks a body and mind, a corporation only 
can act through human agents.”); then citing Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 135 
(2014) (recognizing that a corporation is a distinct legal entity that can act only through its 
agents); and then citing Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 110 (1988) (holding that 
artificially entities such as corporations may act only through their agents)). 
148. See Ripken, supra note 124, at 109. 
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action and agreement of human beings.149 Human involvement is critical, 
as the corporation can only act through the people who manage it.150 The 
aggregate theory holds that “the corporate person has no existence or 
identity that is separate . . . from the natural persons in the corporation.”151 
The entity is entirely owned and managed by people, and the corporation’s 
actions are actually conducted by its employees, as opposed to the 
corporation itself.152  
The aggregate person theory became less prominent during the early 
Twentieth Century, as corporations grew increasingly large in size.153 As 
the role of shareholders became more tangential to the corporation’s 
management, the identity of large corporations became separate from their 
shareholders.154 The corporation no longer resembled the aggregate 
consciousness of its shareholders, because it evolved into its own entity.155 
Additionally, as an artificial entity, the corporation could potentially exist 
indefinitely, whereas individual shareholders cannot.156 These new 
considerations about the increased sized and perpetual duration of 
corporations prompted a new theory to explain corporate personhood.157    
The third theory, the real entity theory, views the corporation as “an 
undeniably real and non-imaginary person.”158 The corporation has its own 
consciousness and its actions are considered qualitatively different from 
those of its members.159 Under this theory, a corporation can act by its own 
volition.160 Hence, the corporation becomes responsible for its own 
actions161 and would assume its own (criminal) liability distinct from any 
potential liability of its members.162 By viewing the corporation as a 
separate entity, the law treats the corporation like an autonomous 
individual.163 The precedent of corporate personhood is the foundation for 
exploring the possibility of expanding legal personhood to other non-
human entities, such as highly advanced autonomous systems.164 
 
149. See id. 
150. See In re Bean, 278 B.R. 567, 568 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2002). 
151. See Ripken, supra note 124, at 110. 
152. See In re Bean, 278 B.R. at 568. 
153. See Ripken, supra note 124, at 111. 
154. See id. 
155. See id.. 
156. See id. 
157. See id. 
158. See Ripken, supra note 124, at 112 (citing W. Jethro Brown, The Personality of 
the Corporation and the State, 21 L. Q. REV. 365, 370 (1905)). 
159. See id. at 114.  
160. See id. 
161. See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 495 
(1909) (recognizing corporate criminal liability). 
162. See Ripken, supra note 124, at 115. 
163. See id.; see also Bayern, supra note 1, at 95. 
164. See Delcker, supra note 3. 
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D. The Laws of War  
As autonomous weapons systems expand, their use must conform to 
the four main principles of the Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and 
IHL.165 Unlike corporations, which are governed by state law, IHL applies 
internationally and provides a set of rules that aim to limit the suffering of 
combatants and non-combatants during a conflict.166 IHL protects those 
who are not participating in the conflict and restricts the “means and 
weapons of warfare.”167 As noted in Additional Protocol I to the Geneva 
Convention,168 IHL applies only during an armed conflict,169 it does not 
apply during peacetime.170  
IHL consists of four main principles: (1) humanity; (2) necessity; (3) 
proportionality; and (4) distinction.171 Humanity prohibits the “infliction 
of suffering, injury, or destruction unnecessary to accomplish a legitimate 
military purpose.”172 Military necessity justifies certain actions as 
necessary to defeat the enemy as efficiently as possible.173 Proportionality 
requires that even when actions may be justified by military necessity, the 
actions should not be unreasonable or excessive.174 Finally, distinction 
refers to the obligation to distinguish between civilians and armed 
forces.175  
 
165. See Dunlap, supra note 98. The terms “Laws of Armed Conflict” and 
“International Humanitarian Law” are very similar and are often used interchangeably. See 
id. This Comment will refer to “International Humanitarian Law” because of its uniform 
recognition in international law and academic discussions. See STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL., 
NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 277 (Rachel E. Barkow et al. eds., 6th ed. 2016). 
166. See DYCUS ET AL., supra note 165, at 278. 
167. War & Law, INT’L COMMITTEE RED CROSS, https://bit.ly/2rcQh0F (last visited 
Oct. 21, 2018). 
168. The Additional Protocols supplement the Geneva Conventions to account for the 
changes in war, from conflicts fought by large State armies into conflicts of States fighting 
smaller non-State actors. See DYCUS ET AL., supra note 165, at 286. 
169. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 48, June 8, 1977, 
1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]. An armed conflict exists when two 
states are engaged in armed violence. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, 
Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995); see also DYCUS ET AL., supra note 165, at 
279.  
170. See DYCUS ET AL., supra note 165, at 278. Peacetime refers to “a time when a 
nation is not at war.” Peacetime, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://bit.ly/2Mkjs9x (last visited 
Jan. 19, 2019). 
171. “Parties shall distinguish between civilians and combatants and between civilian 
objects and military objectives and shall direct military operations only against military 
objectives.” Additional Protocol I, supra note 169, at art. 48.  
172. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., LAW OF WAR MANUAL 50–59 (2015), 
https://bit.ly/2WRuUhj [hereinafter LAW OF WAR MANUAL]. 
173. See id. at 51.  
174. Id. 
175. See id.  
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These principles aim to limit the suffering of non-combatants during 
military attacks.176 Generally, an attack refers to “acts of violence against 
the adversary, whether in offense or in defense.”177 Indiscriminate attacks 
are prohibited.178 Indiscriminate attacks are attacks that are not directed at 
a specific military object, employ a method or means of combat which 
cannot be directed at a specific military objective, or use a method or 
means of combat with effects that cannot be limited as required by the 
Additional Protocol.179  
Autonomous systems differ from traditional weapons, like bullets, 
because these systems employ programming.180 Given that autonomous 
systems operate through software codes, anticipating and accounting for 
their behavior is difficult.181 The uncertainty in predicting the behavior of 
autonomous weapons systems presents challenges because the weapon’s 
operator cannot know whether using the weapon will comply with IHL. 
Moreover, as the weapons advance, their increased independence and 
autonomous functions further obfuscate the proper characterization or 
entity status.182 
IHL heavily relies on the concept of custom.183 Although no 
definition of customary law is universally accepted,184 the international 
community generally accepts international norms that emerge from 
consistent State practice or behavior that, over time, becomes accepted as 
a legal obligation.185 Commenting on the consistency of State practice, the 
 
176. See id. at 15. 
177. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 169. 
178. See id. 
179. See DYCUS ET AL., supra note 165, at 286. Additional Protocol I governs 
international armed conflicts and essentially codifies the laws of war. See DYCUS ET AL., 
supra note 165, at 286. Additional Protocol II allows for greater protection of individuals 
in non-international conflicts. See DYCUS ET AL., supra note 165, at 287. However, the 
United States has not ratified either Additional Protocol I or Additional Protocol II. See 
DYCUS ET AL., supra note 165, at 287. 
180. See Calo, supra note 29, at 534. 
181. See id. 
182. See Perrigo, supra note 13. 
183. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102 (1987). Evidence 
of custom includes treaties, decisions of national courts and international tribunals, national 
legislation, diplomatic correspondence, opinions of national legal advisors, and the practice 
of international organizations. See Customary International Law: Research Guides & 
Background Information, DUKE L., https://bit.ly/2qlkSsm (last visited Dec. 23, 2019) 
(citing Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly (Part II): 
Ways and Means of Making the Evidence of Customary International Law More Readily 
Available, [1950] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 367, ILC Doc. A/1316). 
184. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102 (AM. LAW INST. 
1987). 
185. See id.  
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International Court of Justice in North Sea Continental Shelf186 noted that 
State practice should be “extensive and virtually uniform.”187  
Regardless of the persuasive nature of international legal obligations, 
custom is not equivalent to U.S. law on U.S. soil.188 IHL, however, is still 
relevant to U.S. law.189 In Hamdan v. United States,190 for example, the 
D.C. Circuit noted that Congress essentially incorporates the international 
laws of war into domestic law, rather than creating a U.S. common law of 
war.191 In Hamdan, the court reasoned that the lack of clear consensus 
within customary international law should not create a bright-line rule that 
requires civil or criminal liability within the U.S.192   
Despite the ambiguities of customary international law, the United 
Nations (U.N.) Charter, the foundational treaty of the U.N.,193 has been 
adhered to by almost all States.194 And even the non-member States have 
acquiesced in its principles,195 which reflects the highly persuasive nature 
of international custom.  
Customary international law is relevant when evaluating corporate 
liability in an international context. In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum 
Co.,196 the Second Circuit held that “corporate liability is not a discernable 
norm of customary international law.”197 The court noted that no 
corporation has ever been subject to any form of liability under customary 
IHL.198 The U.S. Supreme Court, in Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority,199 
then extended the Kiobel decision in holding that only a natural person is 
an individual who can be held liable under the Torture Victim Protection 
 
186. See N. Sea Cont’l Shelf (Fed. Rep. Ger. v. Den., Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 
3, 43 (Feb. 20 1969). 
187. Id.  
188. See DYCUS ET AL., supra note 165, at 278. 
189. See id. 
190. See Hamdan v. United States, 696 F.3d 1238, 1250 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
191. See id. at n.10; see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004) 
(ruling that “any claim based on the present-day law of nations [must] rest on a norm of 
international character accepted by the civilized world”). 
192. See Hamdan, 696 F.3d at 1250. 
193. See Charter of the United Nations, UNITED NATIONS, https://bit.ly/34tqQWY 
(last visited Feb. 9, 2019).  
194. See DYCUS ET AL., supra note 165, at 278. 
195. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS Law § 102 cmt. h (AM. LAW 
INST. 1987).  
196. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 121 (2d Cir. 2010). 
197. Id. at 131; see also Jesner v. Arab Bank, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1388 (2018) (holding 
that absent further action from Congress, it was inappropriate for courts to extend ATS 
liability to foreign corporations). 
198. The court considered whether Nigerian residents under a class action lawsuit 
could sue under the ATS claiming that Dutch, British, and Nigerian corporations 
committed human rights abuses and oil exploitation. See Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 123; see also 
Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (West 1948) (“The [United States] district courts 
shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in 
violation of the law of nations or a [United States] treaty . . . .”). 
199. See Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1703 (2012). 
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Act.200 This ruling maintains the distinction between a natural person and 
other entities.201 
However, some contrary precedent suggests that non-human entities 
can violate, and become liable under, international customary law.202 For 
example, the Seventh Circuit in Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co.203 
held that corporate liability was possible under the Alien Tort Statute 
(ATS).204 The Seventh Circuit disagreed with the decision in Kiobel and 
reasoned that even if no corporation had ever been punished for violating 
customary international law, litigation can be used to enforce an 
international norm.205 The court noted that tort liability is a globally 
common consideration when deciding in favor of corporate liability.206 
Within the military, the development of weapon systems with greater 
degrees of autonomy is growing.207 Although these machines may make 
decisions like a human mind or a corporate body, this similarity is not 
enough to merit an independent entity status. 
III. ANALYSIS 
Legal personhood status should not extend to autonomous weapons 
systems. The discussion of legal personhood for military robots has 
received less prominence than that for civil robots, as noted by the 
European Parliament’s recent discussion.208 Even so, analyzing militarized 
autonomous systems will likely follow the recent discussion of whether to 
grant a special type of electronic personhood for autonomous weapons 
systems.209  
Three reasons support the determination that autonomous weapons 
systems do not merit legal personhood based on the corporate personhood 
analogy. First, the doctrines of law that govern corporations and war are 
fundamentally different. Therefore, the extension of personhood to 
autonomous weapons systems based on surface similarities is illogical.210 
Second, international custom does not support equating machines to 
 
200. Id. at 1703. The Torture Victim Protection Act authorizes a cause of action 
against an individual for acts of torture and extrajudicial killings. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 
(2018). 
201. See Mohamad, 132 S. Ct. at 1703. 
202. See Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1015 (7th Cir. 2011). 
203. See id. at 1024  
204. Id.  
205. See id. at 1017.  
206. See id. at 1019.  
207. See supra Section II.B. 
208. See supra Part I. 
209. See supra Part I. 
210. See Burri, supra note 18; see also infra Section III.A. 
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people.211 Third, inanimate objects cannot be deliberately undercapitalized 
in an attempt to escape liability.212 
A. Legal Personhood Under IHL 
The legal personhood theory can only apply to persons, not 
autonomous weapons systems. Corporations are governed by state and 
federal statutes213 (which do recognize legal personhood beyond 
humans)214 whereas autonomous weapons systems are governed by IHL 
(which has no established precedent recognizing personhood beyond 
literal humans).215 Corporate law and IHL support different entities, 
systems, and purposes.216 Even though facially the analogy of extending 
personhood from one non-human entity to another appears logical, this 
comparison will not pass muster when applied to an international doctrine 
based on custom, as opposed to a constitution. State constitutions 
expressly grant corporations recognition, whereas international custom 
(which is not binding law) focuses on governing the behavior of 
persons.217 
Even though the corporate personhood analogy ultimately fails under 
IHL, the surface-level similarities of autonomous systems and 
corporations warrant a discussion about the appropriate entity status for 
autonomous weapons systems. The real entity theory, which views the 
corporation as an independent entity, does not apply to the current 
technology given that the extent of human involvement prevents the 
machines from operating completely independently.218 The two factors of 
longevity and size that prompted theorists to view corporations as real 
entities,219 rather than aggregate bodies, do not apply to robots. First, 
corporations can exist indefinitely,220 whereas technological innovations 
cannot.221 Robots have a lifecycle.222 While this may depend on each 
individual system, the lifecycle may typically last between eight and ten 
 
211. See infra Section III.B. 
212. See infra Section III.C. 
213. See U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
214. See supra Section II.C. 
215. See Dunlap, supra note 98; see also Section II.D. 
216. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. X with U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4. 
217. See Dunlap, supra note 98. 
218. See UNMANNED SYSTEMS INTEGRATED ROADMAP, supra note 110, at 50. Even 
though Russia is developing a weapon to make lethal decisions, and Israel has a fully 
autonomous loitering munition, these developments are advanced outliers and not common 
weapons on the battlefield. See Perrigo, supra note 13. 
219. See Ripken, supra note 124, at 111–12; see also supra Section II.C. 
220. See Ripken, supra note 124, at 114. 
221. Robot Life Cycle-FAQs, MOTION CONTROLS ROBOTICS, https://bit.ly/33ku6Uo 
(last visited Jan. 15, 2019). 
222. See id.  
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years,223 which is shorter than the potentially perpetual duration of a 
corporation.  
Second, an individual autonomous system is smaller than a large 
corporation. Some of the largest corporations on the Fortune 500 list have 
millions of employees and millions of dollars in revenue.224 In contrast, 
autonomous systems are individual pieces of machinery that do not have 
independent assets or revenue values.225 Ultimately, the distinguishing 
factors of the real entity theory do not pertain to autonomous systems.226 
Therefore, despite the apparent independent decision-making of super-
intelligent robots, these systems are not structurally similar enough to 
corporations to be analyzed under the real entity theory.  
 On the other hand, the aggregate theory bears more resemblance to 
the current setup of autonomous weapons systems. Under the aggregate 
theory, the corporation’s identity is inseparable from the humans who 
support it.227 Just as corporations make decisions that are administered by 
human actions (such as directors approving business decisions) 
autonomous systems also rely on humans to make decisions (such as 
creating particular programming to distinguish between military and 
civilian targets when making lethal decisions).228 Under DoD policy,229 
shoot-no-shoot decisions are, ultimately, a human-made decision.230 The 
lethal decision is inseparably connected to the human operator.231 
Therefore, the inherent interconnection between the operator and the 
weapon best resembles the aggregate person theory.232  
Given that autonomous systems operate on the battlefield, not in the 
boardroom, IHL should guide the appropriate entity status for these 
systems because of their specific use in warfare. Instead of assigning 
autonomous systems legal personhood based on the U.S. Constitution and 
drawing from corporate law, weapons experts and governments should 
look to IHL for guidance.233  While IHL does not explicitly address 
 
223. Id. 
224. Wal-Mart is number one on the Fortune 500 list, and reported having 2,300,000 
employees and $500,343,000 in revenue in 2018. Walmart, FORTUNE GLOBAL 500, 
https://bit.ly/2NgAlmt (last visited Jan. 15, 2019). 
225. See supra Section II.A. 
226. See supra Section II.C. 
227. See Ripken, supra note 124, at 110. 
228. See SCHARRE, supra note 64, at 29; UNMANNED SYSTEMS INTEGRATED ROADMAP, 
supra note 110, at 50; Etzioni & Etzioni, supra note 68, at 77. See also Bayern, supra note 
1, at 93. 
229. The current DoD policy requires lethal autonomous systems to remain under 
human control. See UNMANNED SYSTEMS INTEGRATED ROADMAP, supra note 110, at 50. 
230. See UNMANNED SYSTEMS INTEGRATED ROADMAP, supra note 110, at 50. 
231. See id. 
232. See Ripken, supra note 124, at 110; see also supra Section II.C. 
233. In particular, the European government has seriously considered this issue; 
although, the European Commission did not recognize electronic personhood. See Burri, 
supra note 18. 
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autonomous systems, it should be central in evaluating their proper entity 
status because IHL is the relevant law when determining the legality of 
weapons used in conflict.234  
The basic purposes of corporations and autonomous systems are 
dissimilar.235 Autonomous weapons systems increase military efficiencies 
and minimize risk.236 Corporations primarily exist to shield the directors 
from personal liability related to poor business decisions.237 Autonomous 
systems and corporations exist for separate reasons and strive towards 
completely different objectives.238  
An autonomous machine is not the functional equivalent of an 
independent human person, unlike a corporation that can legally functional 
akin to a human person.239 An autonomous weapons system is a weapon. 
Unlike an aggregate corporate body where decisions are made based on 
collective consciousness,240 the machine does not contribute to the 
decision-making process; it responds based on preprogrammed algorithms 
that are physically executed by an operator.241 Although machines operate 
based on codes created by humans, this coordination is less intensive than 
the process directors must undergo when making business decisions 
within an aggregate corporate body.242 Autonomous systems do not 
contribute input regarding their operations.243 Their actions are 
preprogrammed.244 Therefore, autonomous systems operate as inanimate 
objects that are extensions of human decision-making, not as independent 
individuals on the battlefield or as members of the board of directors.  
The laws of war focus on the obligations of the persons engaged in 
war,245 not the conduct of robots.246 IHL regulates and prohibits the use of 
weapons that cause unnecessary suffering or contribute to indiscriminate 
attacks.247 IHL imposes rules on when and how an attack should be 
 
234. See Dunlap, supra note 98. 
235. Compare supra Section II.A. with supra Section II.C. 
236. See UNMANNED SYSTEMS INTEGRATED ROADMAP, supra note 110, at 20. 
237. See Nikki Nelson, The Benefits of Business Incorporation, WOLTERS KLUWER, 
https://bit.ly/2EWfSRT (last visited Oct. 31, 2018).  
238. Compare supra Section II.A with supra Section II.C. 
239. See Kennison v. Daire, (1986) 160 CLR 129, 130 (Austl.) (reasoning that an 
ATM could not give the bank’s consent and no principle of law exists that requires it to be 
treated as though it were a human person). 
240. See Ripken, supra note 124, at 110. 
241. See supra Section II.A. 
242. See UNMANNED SYSTEMS INTEGRATED ROADMAP, supra note 110, at 46; see also 
supra Section II.C. 
243. See UNMANNED SYSTEMS INTEGRATED ROADMAP, supra note 110, at 50.  
244. See supra Section II.B. 
245. See LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 177, at 330. 
246. See SCHARRE, supra note 64, at 269 (noting that “people fight wars, not robots”). 
247. See id. at 251–52. Over time, several international treaties came into effect to 
limit unnecessary suffering. Weapons, INT’L COMMITTEE RED CROSS (Nov. 30, 2011), 
https://www.icrc.org/en/document/weapons. The Geneva Protocol, which has been 
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conducted, with a focus on guiding the human behavior involved in 
conducting an attack.248 
Although weapons used in warfare must conform to IHL principles, 
the standard of adhering to these principles does not require autonomous 
systems to make legal determinations.249 IHL does not focus on the process 
of how a decision is made; under this doctrine of law, the laws focus on 
the results of the action, namely whether an indiscriminate attack has 
occurred.250 In contrast, directors’ obligations under corporate law are 
reviewed based on the process of making business decisions.251 IHL’s 
focus on the results of the process rather than the process itself 
demonstrates that different standards are emphasized when determining 
conformity with the law under corporate law and IHL.252 The different 
standards between these bodies of law reflect that U.S. domestic law and 
international law support different purposes and structures.  
IHL and U.S. law are different legal doctrines that support different 
purposes and afford different legal protections.253 Unlike corporations, 
which have been granted legal personhood based on their roles in a U.S. 
domestic context, autonomous weapons systems operate under IHL, which 
is strongly based on international custom.254 By applying the corporate 
personhood analogy under IHL, the concept of corporate liability would 
have to exist as a recognized principle of international law.255  
B. International Custom: Machines Are Not Humans 
International custom does not support equating machines to people, 
and it remains divided regarding corporate liability, as discussed below.256 
 
supplemented by the Biological Weapons Convention in 1972 and the Chemical Weapons 
Convention in 1993, prohibits the develop, production, acquisition, use of biological and 
chemical weapons. Id. Additionally, the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons limits the use of incendiary weapons. See id. 
248. See SCHARRE, supra note 64, at 269. 
249. See supra Section II.D. 
250. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 169, at art. 48. 
251. Directors of corporations owe fiduciary duties of loyalty and care, which require 
the directors to act in the best interest of the corporation and maintain an informed process 
when making business decisions. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 
1985) (noting that a director’s duty to make an informed business decision falls under the 
duty of care and that the directors engaged in a poor process when approving the merger); 
see also In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 57 (Del. 2006) 
(determining that the compensation committee members were informed when approving 
an expensive severance package, and thus, did not breach their duty of care).  
252. Compare supra Section II.C. with supra Section II.D. 
253. Compare supra Section II.C. with supra Section II.D. 
254. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102 (AM. LAW INST. 
1987); see also supra Section II.D. 
255. See supra Section II.D. 
256. See infra Section III.B. 
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In fact, the existing case law reveals a restrictive view of personhood and 
a limitation on corporate liability as a recognized custom.257  
For example, in Kiobel258 the Second Circuit held that “corporate 
liability is not a discernable norm of customary international law.”259 The 
U.S. Supreme Court then extended the Kiobel decision in Mohamad,260 
holding that only a natural person is an individual who can be held liable 
under the Torture Victim Protection Act.261 These rulings maintain the 
distinction between a natural person and other non-human entities.262 
Notwithstanding the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Flomo, extending 
corporate liability under the ATS, the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Mohamad263 should govern the entity status of autonomous systems 
because of its restrictive view of personhood.264 First, the Court in 
Mohamad focused on the concept of natural personhood, whereas the 
courts in Flomo and Kiobel focused on the concept of corporate liability.265 
Determining the scope of liability is a separate issue from discussing the 
proper entity status for autonomous systems. Given that the analysis in 
Mohamad more closely aligns with the focus of determining personhood, 
Mohamad’s ruling should control.266  
Mohamad cautions against extending legal personhood to anything 
other than a human individual.267 The common meaning of an individual 
refers only to a human being, not an organization, or an entity, or even an 
association.268 Even though the Dictionary Act allows the term “person” 
to include artificial entities,269 a statute should only extend personhood to 
artificial entities if congressional intent clearly warrants such expansion.270 
Absent clear statutory or congressional expression, the U.S. Congress 
likely intends the term personhood to only pertain to human beings.271 The 
 
257. See infra Section III.B. 
258. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 121 (2d Cir. 2010). 
259. Id. at 131; see also Jesner v. Arab Bank, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1388 (2018) (holding 
that absent further action from Congress, it was inappropriate for courts to extend ATS 
liability to foreign corporations). 
260. See Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1703 (2012). 
261. See id. at 1703. The Torture Victim Protection Act authorizes a cause of action 
against an individual for acts of torture and extrajudicial killings. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 
(2018). 
262. See Mohamad, 132 S. Ct. at 1703. 
263. See id. The Torture Victim Protection Act authorizes a cause of action against 
an individual for acts of torture and extrajudicial killings. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2018). 
264. See Mohamad, 132 S. Ct. at 1703. 
265. See Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1024 (7th Cir. 2011); 
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 131 (2d Cir. 2010). 
266. See Mohamad, 132 S. Ct. at 1703. 
267. See id. 
268. See id. 
269. 1 U.S.C. § 1. 
270. See Mohamad, 132 S. Ct. at 1703. 
271. See id. 
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U.S. Congress has not expressed a desire to equate machines to people.272 
Thus, the lack of congressional intent further supports the contention that 
international customary law restrictively views legal personhood as solely 
pertaining to human beings. 
Second, even though the court in Flomo held in favor of extending 
liability for non-human entities, Flomo only dealt with the issue of 
corporate liability under the ATS.273 Flomo may control in specific 
situations where an alien autonomous system violates a statute. Because 
the narrow application of Flomo goes beyond this analysis, the premise of 
Kiobel (that corporate liability is not a norm of customary international 
law)274 should be used to determine the entity status of autonomous 
systems.  
An express, written declaration from the U.N. expanding the term 
“person” to include artificial entities would be the strongest indication of 
support for electronic personhood under IHL, given that IHL follows the 
customary practices of the international community.275 However, the 
international community lacks consensus as to the regulation of these 
systems and their legal status.276 Specifically, even though the European 
Parliament suggested that self-learning robots277 merit electronic 
personalities,278 the European Commission ultimately rejected this 
contention after opposition from experts,279 and the arguments for and 
against an electronic personality remain up for debate.280 The international 
myriad of views falls very short of clear statutory intent to recognize 
 
272. Unlike the U.S. Government, the E.U. has considered recognizing an entity 
status for robots. See Delcker, supra note 3. This legal status would allow robots to be sued 
and insured individually, and obtain liability and protections separate from their creators. 
See id. 
273. See Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1015 (7th Cir. 2011). 
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2015), https://bit.ly/2NgZY6K. 
278. See Delcker, supra note 3. This legal status would allow robots to be sued and 
insured individually, and obtain liability and protections separate from their creators. See 
id. Robots would not be full citizens with all rights of people. See id. For example, they 
would not have the right to marry. See id.; see also supra Part I. 
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electronic personhood.281 Therefore, no express intent, or even a 
consensus, exists to support extending legal personhood beyond a person. 
C. Inanimate Objects Cannot be Undercapitalized 
Autonomous decisions can increase military efficiency, yet they also 
yield questions of accountability.282 In corporate law, when members of 
the board of directors of the corporation (rather than the corporation itself) 
become personally liable, the liability ensues under the piercing the 
corporate veil doctrine.283 Undercapitalization, an important factor when 
deciding to pierce the corporate veil, refers to the deliberate choice to 
establish a shell corporation, without any viable assets, for the sole purpose 
of escaping personal liability.284 However, autonomous systems cannot be 
pierced because, unlike corporations, autonomous systems are not 
financial liability shields. Autonomous systems are just extremely 
advanced pieces of technology; they do not hold financial assets. 
Inanimate objects cannot act to commit fraud, unlike corporations that 
conduct business in their own name.285 
Piercing the corporate veil is appropriate when the totality of the 
circumstances indicates that the corporate form is being used to commit 
fraud or serve an injustice against the corporate form.286 For example, in 
OTR Associates v. IBC Services, Inc.,287 the New Jersey Superior Court 
appropriately pierced the corporate veil.288 IBC had no assets except its 
lease with a parent corporation.289 IBC was created for the sole purpose of 
insulating the parent corporation from liability.290 Thus, the deliberately 
undercapitalized company demonstrated fraud as well as an abuse of the 
corporate form.291 
 
281. U.S. DoD Policy “allows commanders and operators to exercise appropriate 
levels of human judgment over the use of force.” See Perrigo, supra note 13. Russia also 
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Unlike the corporation in OTR Associates, an autonomous weapon 
system is not deliberately created to limit liability for the military.292 
Although similar to shell corporations, in that autonomous systems lack 
their own assets,293 the reason for their lack of assets differs. Shell 
corporations often exist as limited liability loopholes.294 On the contrary, 
weapons systems are pieces of technology that literally cannot hold or 
receive financial assets. Instead of attempting to dodge liability, 
autonomous systems expand military capabilities and minimize military 
risk by accessing previously inaccessible locations and removing humans 
from exceedingly dangerous missions.295 Further, unlike a corporation that 
conducts business in its own name, a weapons system is a preprogrammed 
tool on the battlefield that only follows the commands of its operator.296 
Weapons systems do not fight as independent actors engaged in armed 
conflict.297  
The inapplicability of piercing the corporate veil to weapons systems 
further distinguishes them from corporations and highlights how the 
corporate personhood analogy fails in this context.298 Not only do different 
laws govern autonomous systems than those that regulate corporations,299 
but fundamental concepts of corporate law do not translate to regulating 
weapons. The fact that weapons systems do not have assets is not an 
indication of undercapitalization or fraud, but rather an inherent 
characteristic of military technology, or of any inanimate object. 
Ultimately, the inapplicability of a key method of corporate law further 
supports the argument against extending legal personhood to an entity 
distinct from a corporation. 
D. Recommendation 
Legal personhood should not extend to autonomous systems. To 
successfully extend this doctrine, corporate personhood would have to 
successfully function under IHL.300 However, legal personhood does not 
translate to an international context because the considerations used to 
create a separate entity view of corporate personhood cannot apply to 
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weapon systems,301 and customary international law indicates that the 
concept of personhood should be restricted to actual persons.302 Further, 
piercing the corporate veil, a key doctrine within corporate law, could not 
apply under IHL given that some factors used to impose directors’ 
liability, such as undercapitalization, cannot apply to inanimate objects.303  
Although autonomous systems continue to make more independent 
decisions, governments and lawmakers should still view them only as 
advanced pieces of technology.304 Despite their growing autonomy, at the 
end of the day, these systems are machines.305 Because machines are not 
the functional equivalent of human persons in war,306 their legal entity 
status should not be conflated with that assigned to actual persons.307  
Thus, as legislatures react to AI’s increasingly human characteristics, 
they should recognize that acting like a human does not merit the legal 
status of a human. Although corporations can perform functions similar to 
those of humans, such as entering into contracts,308 corporations received 
a legal status specific to their role in business,309 which evolved to reflect 
the appropriate status of how corporations operate.310 Therefore, given that 
autonomous systems are just advanced machines on the battlefield, they 
do not merit a distinct legal entity status. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Even though autonomous systems make increasingly independent 
decisions, the argument of granting them legal personhood is without 
merit. Although autonomous weapons systems engage in similar decision-
making to that of humans,311 that similarity on its own is not enough to 
justify granting them legal personhood.312 Because autonomous weapons 
systems are weapons used in conflict, their use must comply with IHL.313 
Furthermore, as evidenced by Kiobel and Mohamad, IHL views legal 
personhood restrictively and would not support an extension to 
autonomous weapons systems.314 Finally, the corporate law doctrine of 
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piercing the corporate veil does not apply to autonomous systems.315 
Ultimately, the failed application of the corporate personhood analogy 
under IHL combined with the inapplicability of a key principle of 
corporate law indicates that extending legal personhood to autonomous 
weapons systems cannot succeed.316 Autonomous weapons systems are 
machines, and they should not receive a distinct type of legal 
personhood.317   
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